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and interlineations. Apparently, most will changes are of
the nature wherein there is a partial cancellation combined
with an interlineation, but as yet the Supreme Court of Colorado has never been called upon to rule as to the effect of this.
It has been stated by our court that revocation cannot be
effected (by the testator's act) except in the manner provided
for in the statute.' A recent case in the trial court completely
sustains the view here taken.'
(4) The previous discussion is sufficient to show that
there is no support for a view that Colorado would give effect
to the will as altered except in the situation where the alteration
consists solely of an obliteration and it is impossible to prove
the contents of the obliterated portion. In that situation the
will should be admitted to probate with the obliterated portions blank, and hence the will is given effect as altered. In
all other situations this could not be accomplished.
'Twilley v. Durkee, 72 Colo. 444 at 462, 211 P. 668.
'In re Jones, Estate No. 60817, County Court of City and County of Denver.

THE TAXPAYER'S DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA
By Lois GESSFORD CLARK, School of Law, 1939,
Denver University
HE taxpayer, now deceased, who hailed the case of The
Loan and Trust Company, Executors v. Minnesota' of 1930, the cases following it, and the Federal Interpleader Act' of 1936, as the solution to the oppressive burden of paying two state inheritance taxes on his
intangibles, is stirring uneasily in his grave; and the taxpayer
who has survived the tax burden thus far, is shaking perceptibly in his shoes, and is wondering just what the Supreme
Court of the United States did mean in The Farmers Loan and
Trust Company case when it said, "We have determined that
in general intangibles may be properly taxed at the domicile
of their owner, and we can find no sufficient reason for saying
that they are not entitled to enjoy an immunity against tax-

TFarmers

'280 U. S. 204.
'28 U. S. C. A., para. 41 (26).
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ation at more than one place similar to that accorded to intangibles."
The case expressly overruled Blackstone v. Miller,3
which held that the testamentary transfer of intangibles was
taxable both at the debtor's and at the creditor's domicile
without violating the Fourteenth Amendment. The court
pointed out that the case of Coe v. Errol,4 though cited
to support the proposition, does not say that the Fourteenth
Amendment does not prohibit double taxation. That The
Farmers Loan and Trust Company case does stand for the
proposition that the double taxation there was unconstitutional is made clear by the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
Stone who points out that although he is in agreement with
the holding of the case, it is not on the grounds that double
taxation is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
same proposition was repeated by the court in Baldwin v.
Missouri5 and the First National Bank of Boston v. Maine'
when it said, "Due regard for the processes of correct thinking compels the conclusion that a determination fixing the
local situs of a thing for the purpose of transferring it in
one state, carries with it an implicit denial that there is a local
situs in another state for the purpose of transferring the same
thing there * * * that shares of stock, like other intangibles, constitutionally can be subjected to a death transfer
tax by one state only."
It should be noticed that in these three cases, The Farmers
Loan and Trust Company v. Minnesota, Baldwin v. Missouri, and First National Bank of Boston v. Maine, the
court was refusing to allow the transfer at death of an
intangible to be taxed by two states on inconsistent theories.
The theory of the state of the debtor's domicile was that it
could tax the succession to the intangibles since the chose in
action was created and existed by virtue of its laws; the theory
of the state of the decedent's domicile was that under the old
rule of mobilia sequuntur personam, the domicile governs the
transfer and succession at death to an intangible and so it could
tax that succession. It seems almost elementary, therefore,
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that if it is unconstitutional double taxation for two states
to tax the transfer of intangibles, basing their power on two
inconsistent and different theories, it is even more clearly a
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment for two states to tax
the same transfer of intangibles on the same theory, that is, on
the theory that each state is the domicile of the decedent.
We have it from eminent authorities7 that every person
has at all times one and only one domicile, and yet in spite of
this rule and in spite of the pronouncement of the court as to
the unconstitutionality of double taxation of intangibles by
states in The Farmers Loan and Trust Company v. Minnesota and similar cases, in the case of Dorrance et al. v. Martins
the Supreme Court of the United States refused to grant
certiorari even though both New Jersey and Pennsylvania
had decided it was the decedent's domicile and had proceeded
to collect a tax on the succession to the decedent's intangibles. This refusal to grant certiorari, although it settled the
case, did not give as clear cut a decision on the issue as could
be hoped for and the taxpayer continued to hope that the
Supreme Court meant what it said in The Farmers Loan and
Trust Company case about the unconstitutionality of double
taxation. The question of domicile, of course, is a question
of jurisdiction, and may be inquired into by other states when
the question is properly raised there. This is not precluded
by the full faith and credit clause, since if the court has no
jurisdiction, it cannot render a valid judgment or decree which
must be recognized in sister states. Therefore, even if state A
decides the decedent is domiciled there, state B may also decide
that the decedent is domiciled in state B, and both states claim
the power to collect an inheritance tax on the intangibles of
the decedent; and in a more rare situation both states may
decide that the decedent was not a domiciliary, and he will
slumber on peacefully in his grave taxed by neither state.
The taxpayer, after The Farmers Loan and Trust Company case had raised his hopes and the Dorrance case had
dulled them, discovered in the Federal Interpleader Act of
1936' what he thought was his salvation from the anomaly
of two states or forty-eight deciding that he was domiciled
'Restatement of Conflict of Laws, Sec. 10.
s298 U. S. 678.

'28 U. S. C. A., para. 41 (26).
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there. This act seemed to provide a procedure which was so
perfectly suited to his case that he dared to predict that the
Supreme Court would remember what it had said in The
Farmers Loan and Trust Company case and uphold his constitutional right to be free from double taxation by states and
the right of his personal representative to bring suit under
the act.
Briefly, the act which was reall" -n amendment to section 24 of the Judicial Code, provides that the United States
District Courts shall have original jurisdiction of bills of interpleader and bills in the nature of interpleader, filed by any
person, firm, or corporation having in his possession money
or property of the value of five hundred dollars or more which
two or more adverse claimants, citizens of different states are
claiming. The Complainant, the one who files the bill, is
required to deposit the money or property in the registry of
the court or give bond for it; and the bill expressly declares
that such a suit may be brought even though the titles or claims
of the adverse claimants do not have a common origin, are not
identical, but adverse and independent of each other. The
suit may be brought in the district court of the district in
which one of the claimants resides and the district court has
the power to issue process for all claimants, and to issue injunctions restraining the claimants from instituting or prosecuting any suit concerning the claim in a state or federal court.
Since this act seemed to cover precisely the case of tax officials
of two states claiming an inheritance tax on intangibles on the
basis of domicile of the decedent, in 1936 the suit of Worcester
County Trust Company v. Long1" was brought in the District Court for the district of Massachusetts by a Massachusetts executor and citizen. On June 26, 1935, the will of
Robert H. Hunt had been admitted to probate in Massachusetts and the complainant was appointed executor. At his
death, Mr. Hunt owned a bank deposit and other intangibles
in Massachusetts and a bank deposit in California. On July
29, 1935, the Security First National Bank of Los Angeles
was appointed administrator with will annexed in ancillary
proceedings in the Superior Court of California. Tax officials of both Massachusetts and California asserted that Mr.
14 Fed. Supp. 754.
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Hunt was domiciled there and each claimed a considerable sum
as inheritance taxes on his intangibles. On the grounds that
this was a denial of due process, a denial of equal protection
of the law, and that there was an adequate remedy at law, the
Massachusetts executor filed suit under the Interpleader Act
of 1936, interpleading the tax officials of Massachusetts and
California. From a practical standpoint the executor was in
difficulty since prolonged litigation would cause the estate
great expense, prevent distribution immediately, and compel
the executor to keep large cash reserves on hand at little or no
interest to pay the taxes. The complainant asked that the
court grant him a temporary injunction against the tax officials and decide the domicile of Mr. Hunt so that the tax could
be paid. The District Court granted a temporary injunction
and the taxpayer's hope of a solution to his problem seemed
about to be realized.
His hopes, however, were short-lived for on March 15,
1937, the Circuit Court of Appeals" for the First Circuit reversed the decree granting the injunction; and on December 6,
1937, the Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari" leaving the taxpayer back in his dilemma. He must
pay two state inheritance taxes on his intangibles in spite of
the fact that among the words of the court refusing certiorari
appeared the following: "This court has held states statutes
construed to impose death taxes upon the intangibles of decedents domiciled elsewhere infringe the Fourteenth Amendment, and it has accordingly reversed judgments of state courts
enforcing such liability." The court thereupon cites the case
of the Farmers Loan and Trust Company v. Minnesota and
the First National Bank v. Maine.
The court based its refusal of certiorari on the following
propositions:
1. This is a suit against a state and violates the Eleventh Amendment.
2. The petitioners do not assert that the tax laws of
Massachusetts and California include the taxation on death
of the intangibles of those domiciled in other states, or that
1189 Fed. 2nd 59.
12302

U. S. 292.
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the courts of those states have ever held that their laws should
be thus applied.
3. No constitutional provision requires uniformity of
judicial decision by state courts.
As to the first of these propositions, that is, that such a
suit violates the Eleventh Amendment, the case of ex parte
Young 8 settled that question. A suit against an officer of a
state is not necessarily a suit against a state. If an officer is acting unconstitutionally or illegally, even though under the authority of a state statute, he is not the state for the purpose of
such action and may be enjoined. In the case of tax officials
being sued to prevent double taxation of the intangibles of the
decedent, the tax official of one state must be acting unconstitutionally and illegally, since a person is domiciled in only one
state at a time. Therefore a suit to enjoin the tax official from
tax unconstitutionally is not a suit against a state.
collecting
As toa the
second proposition, that the complainant does
not point to any state law or judicial decision of California or
Massachusetts which holds that the intangibles of a decedent
may be taxed in a state where he is not domiciled, the answer
is that due process applies to substance as well as form; and
that although a law may be constitutional on its face, and the
necessary notice and opportunity to be heard is given, nevertheless in its application the law may be unconstitutional.14
As to the third contention, that no constitutional provision requires uniformity of judicial decision, this is a generality which begs the question. The complainant asserts that
one of the states in question is acting unconstitutionally in
demanding the inheritance tax on intangibles, since the Supreme Court of the United States has held that double taxation of intangibles violates the Fourteenth Amendment.
It is interesting to note that the answers of the complainant to the objections to bringing the suit were so highly regarded by Mr. Long, Tax Commissioner of Massachusetts
and a claimant under the bill of interpleader, that he made no
objection to the bill on jurisdictional grounds and approved
the practice of bringing suit under the Federal Interpleader Act
as a method of settling a question of disputed domicile. It is
::209 U. S.123.
"YickWo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356.
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interesting to note also that Mr. Justice Stone, who wrote a
concurring opinion in the Farmers Loan and Trust Company
case, spoke for the court in the Worcester County Trust Company case. In the former case Mr. Justice Stone pointed out
that he did not concur in the proposition that double taxation
violates the Fourteenth Amendment, but that he believed the
transfer of intangibles on death should be taxed at the domicile
of the decedent and not the domicile of the debtor, since the
tax is an excise or privilege tax on the transfer of an intangible,
which transfer or privilege is enjoyed in the state of the domicile of the decedent. Even if these narrow grounds for the
decision were accepted, this does not explain away the rules
that one has only one domicile at a time, and that the domicile
only can impose a transfer tax at death on intangibles; and
when two states collect such a tax on the basis of domicile,
certainly the taxpayer is being deprived of his property without due process of law.
It is thought by some that the taxpayer has a ray of hope
in the case of Texas v. Florida, et al.,' 5 now in the Supreme
Court of the United States. * Texas filed an original complaint
in the Supreme Court against Florida, Massachusetts and New
York to determine the domicile of Colonel Edward Green,
who died possessed of a forty-four million dollar estate. Because of its indeterminate state, it is difficult to make a prediction as to the real effect of the case; but since the Supreme
Court took jurisdiction because this was a suit between states
and not because a federal question as to double taxation might
be involved, and since Texas brought the suit to protect its
own interests and not those of a taxpayer, it may well be that
the most the case shows is a willingness on the part of the Supreme Court to cooperate to determine the true domicile of a
decedent.
At the present time, therefore, the taxpayer will be protected against double taxation on his intangibles at the domicile of the debtor, which is not the domicile of the taxpayer,
since the court has said this is double taxation and a violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment; but his is a hollow victory
indeed, when two states or forty-eight decide he is domiciled
there and assess an inheritance tax against his intangibles. He
1301 U. S. 671; 302 U. S. 662.

* (Decided in favor of Massachusetts.)
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might just as well be philosophical and sigh, "Logic and taxation are not always the best of friends.""
"'From the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice McReynolds in Sonneborn Brothers
v. Cureton, 262 U. S. 506.

FROM THE FLOOR OF HELL TO THE CEILING OF
HEAVEN
By HELEN THORP, School of Law, 1939, Denver University
HE law, it is said, is in a constant state of flux. In no
field is this statement more apposite than in the field pertaining to aeronautics. The development of aircraft law
presents one of the best examples of the adaptation (and, according to some authorities, the overthrow) of ancient and
well settled legal principles to present-day needs.
The root of the trouble as far as aviation law is concerned arose in the early part of the fourteenth century when
(as has been asserted)' Cina da Pistoia offered his celebrated
maxim, "cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum." In forming
his rule of law, Signor da Pistoia gave little thought to Icarus'
abortive attempt to conquer the air, and the courts in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries were totally unconcerned with
the designs for flying machines then-being drawn by Cesare
Borgia's protege, Leonardo da Vinci. The maxim sounds so
neat, so all-inclusive. The courts through the centuries happily announced
and embedded it in the law.
The adventit of
the airplane as a practical thing presented
no small problem. Its importance in modern commercial and
economical life was not underestimated by the courts. But
freedom of flight across the country could not be reconciled
with the old maxim.
Several theories were advanced by the courts and the
writers to solve the dilemma. In general they were the theories
of privilege, of zones of use-as of expected use-and of nuisance. It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss or analyze
these theories in any great detail.
The nuisance theory has its basis in the idea that there is
176
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